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1. Premise. 
In order to address the topic of “culturally-motivated crimes” that are committed by 
immigrants, it will be necessary to begin from the following preliminary statement. 
During the last decades, Italy has evolved into a multicultural society as a result of 
immigration. 
As a matter of fact, whenever migrants leave their country of origin, whenever Albanians, 
Moroccans, Romanians, Chinese, Egyptians, Syrians come to Italy, they carry with 
themselves their cultural background, and this luggage cannot be seized at the border! 
Therefore, migration becomes, for our country, a source of plurality of cultures. 
 
 
2. “Culture”. 
But what do we mean, more precisely, by “culture” in the context of multiculturalism, 
multicultural society and, hence, culturally-motivated offences? 
The concept of culture is extremely ambiguous per se and compatible with more than one 
definition and meaning; moreover, the notion is particularly fashionable; we hear, for 
instance, people talking about “food culture”, “football culture”, “enterprise culture” and so 
on. Nevertheless, what do we mean by “culture” with regard to multicultural societies and 
culturally-motivated offences? 
 
We adopt the interpretation of culture that was provided in anthropology (although there is 
some scholarly disagreement). We refer to a complex and organized system of ways of living 
and thinking, conceptions of just, good and beauty, which are deeply rooted in a social group 
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and, within that group, are passed down, while evolving and altering themselves, from 
generation to generation. 
 
We also adopt from anthropology and other human sciences the emphasis on the crucial 
importance of culture in the formation of mankind and its own biological evolution. 
Human beings are, indeed, “culture-bearing animals”: nothing is purely natural in them. 
Even human functions that correspond to physiological needs, such as hunger, sleep, sexual 
desire etc., are moulded by culture, and, in truth, different cultures do not provide the same 
answers to these needs. 
Culture offers, therefore, the codes, the “keys” to organize and interpret the external reality. 
 
I will give an example to clarify this statement: if I, here in Cagliari, enter a religious site 
(like a church) wearing shoes on my feet, this would be considered an attitude that is 
absolutely respectful of the custom; on the contrary, you would consider me rude if I entered 
barefooted. 
However, if I enter with my shoes a religious site in Istanbul (like the Blue Mosque), because 
of the culture of that place I will commit a disrespectful act. 
The same behaviour or the same set of circumstances – entering a religious site wearing 
shoes – acquires a different meaning when it is interpreted through different cultural lenses. 
 
 
3. Let’s try to address the question at the heart of this talk: What does “culture” have to 
do with criminal law? 
The nexus is based on the close relationship between criminal law and the social group of 
which the criminal system is the manifestation: law (and criminal law in particular), is a 
cultural phenomenon, as Radbruch already declared almost a century ago: “Law is a 
cultural artifact”  
Many criminal norms are expressions of the culture of the people, of the social group that 
adopts them: the culture of this social group becomes embedded in the criminal norms 
established by the same group. 
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) is aware of this, as it recognizes – I quote a 
ruling of 2006 – “the criminal offenses involve a culturally conditioned assessment of the 
considered behaviours” 
 
In order to experience the effects of culture on criminal law, one could consider the numerous 
norms of our Criminal Code which, in order to qualify the offense, refer to the so-called 
cultural normative concepts, that is those concepts that can be understood and 
acknowledged only in light of a body of cultural norms. 
Let’s give a few examples:  
- the concept of “prurient interest” that appears in obscenity crimes; 
- the concept of “public decency”;  
- the concept of “motives of relevant moral or social values”, or, its opposite, the “vain 
and futile motives”; 
- finally, the concept of “sexual acts”. 
 
These concepts can only be fully understood by referring to a body of cultural (ethical, moral, 
customary) norms. 
 
A further evidence of the cultural bias of criminal law could be found in issues, such as  
- abortion,  
- euthanasia,  
- medically assisted procreation,  
- homosexuality,  
- adultery,  
- consumption of drugs,  
- educational methods (including or excluding the use of violence),  
- blasphemy,  
- animal abuse,  
- prostitution:  
all cases, where criminal regulations change, often significantly, from country to country in 
light of the prevailing culture. 
Consequently, crossing borders often determines a “switch” to a different criminal system. 
 
An example for all: 
If an adult, here in Cagliari, has a consensual sexual relation with a fifteen-year-old girl, the 
event is legally irrelevant: our Criminal Code, indeed, sets the threshold under which a 
prohibition of sexual act with minor takes place to 14 years old. 
However, if the same adult spends a weekend in Zurich with this fifteen-year-old girl and 
therefore has a sexual relationship in Switzerland, he is committing a crime (since the 
threshold in the Swiss Criminal Code is 16 years old).  
Moreover, if the young partner is not yet 14 years old, the couple may spend the weekend in 
Barcelona, since the Spanish Criminal Code (until a few years ago) declared that an adult is 
committing a crime only if he or she has a sexual relationship with a minor under 13 years of 
age. 
 
If such differences emerge between countries that are culturally similar (in our example Italy, 
Switzerland and Spain), then a fortiori, they may easily appear between countries that are 
culturally “distant”.  
Borrowing a popular Italian saying, we could easily claim that: “country you go, crime you 
find!” 
 
Therefore, migrants are often confronted with rules of our Criminal Code that they do not 
know or do not understand because of their different culture.  
Their cultural background often includes principles and concepts that are different from those 
in the country they have moved into and that can create normative and cultural conflicts.  
Let’s consider, for instance, the female genital mutilation: 
On one hand, we have certain ethnic groups, whose culture says that young girls need to 
undergo this procedure; 
On the other hand, the Criminal Code of countries like Italy, whose culture does not 
recognize the custom of FGM, forbids such a practice because it is considered a violation of 
personal integrity and women’s dignity.  
Here is the conflict! 
In the last decade, criminal law scholars have begun to analyze such issues that raise 
situations of conflict, adopting the concept of “culturally motivated crime”. It means:  
“an act by a member of a minority culture (= an immigrant), 
 which is considered an offence by the legal system of the dominant culture (=Italian culture).  
That same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender, condoned, accepted 
as normal behavior and approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given situation 
(Van Broeck) 
 
 
4. Now, how should our legal system react when a migrant commits a culturally 
motivated crime? 
Does the Criminal Code have to consider the migrant’s country of origin and the situation of 
cultural conflict? Does it have to borrow the North American expression “cultural defense”? 
Should criminal law rather ignore the cultural motivation? Or should it even consider the 
latter an aggravating circumstance? 
Moreover, a further inquiry heavily impacts on the issues raised so far: how does the 
defending counsel prove in court the offender’ s different culture and the impact it had on 
her/his behaviour? How do we distinguish, case by case, between the “culture of origin” of 
the defendant and her/his “personal inclination”? 
 
Before we address these questions, we need to underline the existence of a risk in the process 
that we should be aware of : 
This risk of emotional reactions out of control, the risk to make decisions based on our 
guts, rather than on our brains. 
However, a powerful measure against this threat, a “vaccine”, comes from Italians’ past. 
 
1. Looking at our past, we could actually notice, first of all, how some of the current most 
frequent culturally motivated crimes were tolerated or, at the very least, considered with 
far more generous indulgence from our legal system until a few decades ago. 
We refer to honour killings and other crimes based on “cause of honour” that our penal 
system considered with extreme magnanimity until 1981;  
sexual assault charges that were removed by a “reparatory marriage” as a special case of 
discharge from crime, which was a cruel mockery imposed on the assaulted woman;  
if, instead, the sexual assault would take place after marriage, our law would give the 
husband a sort of exemption from raping charges, as long as he would “contain” his violent 
acts secundum naturam; 
furthermore, we are dealing with a numerous amount of insults, assaults and personal injuries 
committed within a domestic environment, covered for a long time by the protective umbrella 
of ius corrigendi, recognized under various conditions to parents and husbands committing 
criminally relevant acts against, respectively, their children and their wives. 
 
2. Moreover, in our past, there is a long history of emigration, which contributed to the 
formation of a conspicuous amount of judicial records: Italian defendants emigrated in 
Switzerland, Germany, America and so on, that invoked their Italian culture as their defense. 
As an example, we can mention the old case of Josephina Reggio, emigrated to New York 
from Sicily: charged with murder, she declared that she had preserved her honour of “onesta 
picciotta” in the traditional Sicilian way. 
But we can also mention the very recent case of a Sardinian waiter emigrated to Germany. 
Despite the serious harm he caused to his partner through cruel maltreatments and sexual 
violence, which he justified because of an alleged infidelity, the Sardinian waiter received a 
moderate punishment from the German judges. According to the ruling, he had been “driven 
by an excessive impetus of jealousy, a passion that was rooted in his particular ethno-
cultural print”: “the conception of the role of man and woman” that was common all over 
Sardinia and was still part of the defendant’s cultural background, “although it cannot count 
as a justification, it must be taken into account in order to be determine a less severe 
punishment”. 
 
After having taken the “vaccine” coming from our past, we are now ready to deal with the 
inquiries that we described above in relation to the culturally-motivated crimes. 
But the answer to those inquiries cannot be an absolute one, neither can it be expressed 
through a single legal proposition always valid for all the cases of culturally-motivated crime. 
The term “culturally motivated crime” is, indeed, a very broad label that includes 
extremely heterogeneous cases, which – despite having in common the fact that the 
defendant justifies himself in front of the judge through her/his culture of origin – might 
differ because of crucial variables. 
 
1) The first variable, whose importance immediately stands out, concerns the legal asset 
offended, its nature, its rank and the intensity of the suffered harm. 
 
In principle, both  
pretty irrelevant actions and  
extremely harmful ones,  
can be qualified as culturally motivated crimes.  
 
Our judges, for instance, had to deal with cases that evaluated 
 If the use of burqa worn by women due to their Islamic religion and culture could be 
qualified as the crime of “obstacle to personal identification” (Legge Reale of 1975); or 
 
If the Indians that follow the Sikh religion, whenever found in public areas wearing a pocket-
knife with its sheath (the kirpan, one of the symbols of the Sikh religion - like the clearly 
harmless turban), are committing the crime of carrying a weapon without a permit. 
 
However, it is clear that we cannot automatically apply the legislative or judicial solutions, 
that can be appropriate for the above-mentioned bagatelle cases, into other cases that entail a 
harm to fundamental rights of an individual. 
The “cultural defense” has been invoked, as a matter of fact, by immigrants accused of  
- domestic abuses 
- homicides and personal injuries, in particular to defend one own’s honour or that of 
their family 
- slavery 
- sexual assaults, often committed within the household (or by members of the same 
family) 
 
2) The second variable, which advises us against the use of a “single measure” for every 
culturally motivated crime, deals with the cultural norm that the defendant has followed: 
- at first, indeed, it might be useful to verify whether such a norm can be qualified also in 
terms of religious norm;  
- furthermore, it might be suitable to verify whether such cultural norm finds its counterpart 
also in a norm of positive law, in force in the judicial system of the immigrant’s country of 
origin; 
- in the third place, it would be appropriate to inquire about the degree to which such cultural 
norm is binding within the original group of the defendant: such norm, indeed, might merely 
enable a particular practice (as it is polygamy between Muslims) or be enforced with a high 
level of coercion and with a powerful apparatus of sanctions (as it happens in certain 
communities with regard to the practices of female and male circumcision); furthermore, 
such norm might be homogeneously followed by every member of the cultural group whom 
the defendant belongs to, or rather challenged by a big part of that group. 
 
3) Finally, a third “variable” – which distinguishes the different cases of culturally motivated 
crimes – involves the biography of the defendant, particularly her/his level of integration in 
the country of arrival and, on the contrary, his level of ongoing attachment to the culture of 
origin: the case may involve an immigrant who, regardless of the moment of arrival in the 
new country, did not have the chance to socialize in that country, or, instead, an immigrant 
who is well integrated, at least with regard to some aspects of his public life. 
It is clear that the credibility of the “cultural motive” and the likeliness of its significance pro 
reo, are inversely proportional to the level of social inclusion of the defendant in the country 
where the trial occurs. 
  
I reckon that these 3 variables were adequately considered during the recent ruling of the 
Court of Appeal of Venice. 
This ruling was issued on 23 November 2012 on the first FGM trial in Italy since the Italian 
law of 2006 was adopted on the matter (art. 583 bis of Italian Criminal Code). 
The event, that took place in Verona, concerned Nigerian citizens, belonging to the Edo-bini 
community: a woman who was a midwife in Nigeria but did not have a license to regularly 
practice in Italy, a young Nigerian mother, and a young Nigerian father.  
The parents wanted the “midwife” to perform the “aruè”, a short and superficial incision of 
the clitoris on their newborn daughters. 
In first instance the defendants were convicted, even if the punishment was not severe, for the 
crime of injury of female genital organs (583 bis p. 2 ital. c.p.). 
On the contrary the Court of Appeal acquitted the parents for lack of malice: that specific 
malice – “the purpose of disabling sexual functions” – explicitly required by the art. 583 bis 
p. 2 ital. c.p. 
Thanks to the testimony of a series of experts (one academic of educational anthropology; 
one academic of pedagogy of mediation; a Christian priest belonging to the Edo-bini 
community, who had migrated to Italy about 20 years ago), the Court of Appeal of Venice 
recognized that the parents wanted to impose the practice of “aruè” to their children in order 
to celebrate a ritual of purification and humanization, and to shape their daughters’ identity 
They neither wanted to cause any harm to these children nor to damage their sexual 
functions. 
The Venetian judges carefully observed the above-mentioned variables: 
1) as for the legal asset offended, the judges pointed out in that case that the physical 
integrity was the only thing that had been compromised (and not also the woman’s dignity) 
and, most importantly, that the physical integrity of both little girls was minimally damaged, 
without any permanent consequence; 
2) as for the cultural norm followed by the defendants, the judges underlined its high level 
of dissemination , of commitment and observation within the cultural group of the Edo-Bini; 
3) lastly, with regard to the personal biographies of the defendants, the Venetian judges 
pointed out that the young mother was a person lacking of high education, who migrated to 
Italy not long before, barely understood Italian language and was completely isolated from 
the Italian community; as for the father, the judges pointed out his high commitment to his 
culture of origin: as we can understand from the ruling, he was connected by a feeling of deep 
belonging to the Edo-bini community, which pushed him to respect his traditions. 
 
On the contrary, when we analyze the rulings that deal with abuses, homicides, sexual 
violence, deep personal injuries, we can easily notice that in these instances the first of the 
three variables – the legal asset offended – is invariably an obstacle to an evaluation of the 
cultural motivation that could lead to an acquittal. 
The Supreme Court, indeed, has established a trend, according to which whenever “the 
conducts under scrutiny are characterized by a clear violation of the essential and inviolable 
rights of an individual, which constitute a cornerstone of our constitutional system, an 
insurmountable barrier has to be erected against the introduction in the civil society of ‘anti-
historical’ habits, procedures and customs”. 
 
In spite of such statement, if we look carefully, we can see that cultural motivations have an 
impact, if not on the an, at least on the quantum of the punishment, as shown in the last case I 
will talk about. 
This case is about two young Moroccan migrants that on December 2001 got married. The 
marriage was arranged by the parents of the bride. 
After the first days of cohabitation, the husband forced his wife to have a sexual intercourse, 
and repeated the same behaviour over the following days, until the wife went back to her 
parents. 
The husband was sentenced for the crime of sexual violence and appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
Not only he completely ignored that in Italy sexual violence is a crime even when it occurs 
within a marriage, but also he ignored that his wife had been forced to marry him by her own 
parents; furthermore, the events in question occurred during the first week of the marriage 
between two virgin and sexually inexperienced spouses. 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, but recognized to the defendant the mitigating 
circumstance of “minor seriousness of the offence” according to article 609 bis p. 3 Italian 
Criminal Code. The Supreme Court observed that the case deals with acts that occurred 
between young spouses, in the context of which the “common culture of origin denies that a 
sexual violence between spouses can be considered a crime”; thus the final verdict results 
undoubtedly mild. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The jurisprudential solutions that I described deserve, in my humble opinion, a great deal of 
attention and respect, as they show that a cautious and well defined identification of the 
cultural factor pro reo – following a careful evaluation of the aforesaid variables – could 
result not only possible, but also fair and appropriate. 
The fulfillment of the crime could, indeed, truly constitute the outcome of a cultural clash 
that is still unresolved and, therefore the crime committed by the migrant of a “different” 
cultural background might actually be considered – like Alison Renteln has eloquently 
highlighted in her excellent book – less culpable than an identical crime committed by a 
defendant of Italian culture. 
 
Thank you for listening! 
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